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Abstract: In 2009, a novel A(H1N1) influenza virus emerged with rapid human-to-human spread
and caused the first pandemic of the 21st century. Although this pandemic was considered mild
compared to the previous pandemics of the 20th century, there was still extensive disease and death.
This virus replaced the previous A(H1N1) and continues to circulate today as a seasonal virus.
It is well established that vaccines are the most effective method to alleviate the mortality and
morbidity associated with influenza virus infections, but the 2009 A(H1N1) influenza pandemic,
like all significant infectious disease outbreaks, presented its own unique set of problems with
vaccine supply and demand. This manuscript describes the issues that confronted governments,
international agencies and industries in developing a well-matched vaccine in 2009, and identifies
the key improvements and remaining challenges facing the world as the next influenza pandemic
inevitably approaches.
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1. Introduction
Influenza remains a viral respiratory disease of global importance. In 2018–2019, the world
observed the centenary of the start of the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic. The impact of this pandemic
was an estimated toll of 50 million deaths resulting in an observable decline in life expectancy in many
countries [1,2]. Subsequent pandemics occurred in 1957–1958 and 1968–1969 during periods when
significant progress in medical science had been made, including the identification of the viral agent,
influenza, the development of influenza vaccines, antiviral drugs and diagnostics and, importantly,
antibiotics to treat secondary bacterial infections [3]. In 2009, the first pandemic of the 21st century
occurred with the emergence of a new form of the A(H1N1) virus, now known as A(H1N1)pdm09.
In the first year A(H1N1)pdm09 circulated, it was estimated to have been responsible for between
151,700 and 575,400 deaths [4]. The virus mainly infected young children and adults but also caused
significant deaths in the elderly (over 65 years of age) population [5]. Ten years on, we review some
of the lessons learned from the 2009 pandemic in regard to influenza vaccines and their production,
what has changed and what challenges remain when the next, inevitable, influenza pandemic occurs.
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2. Global Capacity of Influenza Vaccine Production
In 2009, the global influenza monovalent pandemic vaccine capacity was 2.7 billion doses
(assuming a single 15 µg haemagglutinin (HA)/dose [6]) and the world’s population was approximately
6.85 billion, meaning approximately one-third of the world could be immunised with a pandemic
influenza vaccine. In 2019 it has been estimated that, under the same assumptions, the global influenza
pandemic vaccine capacity has increased to 6.4 billion doses, meaning that there would now be a
pandemic vaccine for over three-quarters of the global population [7,8] (Figure 1). Various factors
have contributed to this increase in manufacturing capability, such as: the World Health Organization
(WHO) Global Action Plan for Influenza Vaccines (GAP) Program, a coordinated effort to strengthen
vaccine production capability [9,10]; the switch from trivalent to quadrivalent seasonal vaccines; the
use of high dose antigen (x4 the seasonal antigen dose) for seasonal vaccines for the elderly; and the
increased use of adjuvants in vaccines [8]. Thus, the level of pandemic influenza vaccine coverage has
substantially increased despite the growth in global population. One large caveat on these estimates
is that they represent a full year’s output of manufacturing. Full-scale vaccine manufacturing of a
pandemic vaccine would only commence once a suitable manufacturing strain was prepared and tested,
which together takes approximately 3–6 months (see below and Figure 2), meaning that a vaccine
would only be available after the first wave of the pandemic had passed through many countries.
Figure 1. Comparison of estimated global vaccine capacity (15 µg HA/dose, black bars) and global
population (white bars) in 2009 and 2019 (estimated from [6–8]).
3. Currently Available Influenza Vaccines
In 2009, over 95% of the registered influenza vaccines in the world were generated in
embryonated hen’s eggs and at least two-thirds of influenza vaccines were produced by just seven
manufacturers [11]. This included split virion and sub-unit vaccines, as well as live attenuated intranasal
vaccines [11]. Since 2009, the number of influenza vaccine manufacturers has significantly increased
(currently at least 32 manufacturers with full-scale manufacturing facilities and licensed vaccines)
and manufacturing is more widespread, particularly in Asia and South America ([11–14], E. Sparrow
personal communication). Furthermore, a number of new technologies have been developed or
expanded and are now registered for use in producing influenza vaccines. These include the increased
use of mammalian cells to grow viruses, and the further use of baculovirus and insect cell expression
systems as well as other expression systems such as plant-based vaccine production systems that
are also in late stage development [15,16]. Most of these systems are now being utilised for seasonal
influenza vaccines but could be rapidly re-deployed to produce a pandemic influenza vaccine when
required. Moreover, vaccines produced using nanoparticles and chimeric HAs have been recently
used in phase 1 clinical trials and have potential to be used in the context of a pandemic [17–19].
There are key differences in the manufacturing processes of egg, cell and recombinant protein systems
to ensure that the maximum number of doses for each platform are produced (Figure 2). Egg-based
influenza vaccines require the development of high growth reassortants to improve virus yield, a
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process which involves either reassorting candidate vaccine viruses (CVV) with high growth laboratory
strains of influenza, or the use of “reverse-genetics” (RG), whereby influenza viruses are produced
“synthetically” using a series of plasmids encoding the gene segments of the pandemic virus and the
high growth laboratory strain [20]. Both activities occur in just a handful of specialised laboratories.
These reassorted/RG CVVs must undergo antigenic analysis, sequencing of the HA and neuraminidase
(NA) genes and preliminary yield evaluation prior to large-scale production. Our experience from
generating vaccines over many decades, including for the pandemics of 1957, 1968 and 2009 and
for pre-pandemic strains such as A(H5N1) and A(H7N9), is that the yield of vaccine available is
determined by the specific strain. Cell culture production systems, such as those that use various
forms of MDCK or Vero cells, allow for faster scale-up in case of pandemics, as they are not limited
by the supply of embryonated hen’s eggs. Wildtype CVVs may be used if the pandemic virus is of
low pathogenicity and the virus is high yielding in cell-based production, otherwise CVVs generated
by reverse genetics may be required. Cell culture vaccines may also offer an advantage with certain
influenza viruses by providing antigenically better matched vaccines to some influenza strains in
humans by avoiding egg adaptions, which can reduce vaccine effectiveness [21]. Vaccines that utilise
conventional recombinant protein technologies have the advantage of not requiring the pandemic
virus or a CVV for production and can instead be produced with just the sequence of the HA (and other
genes such as the NA or matrix if required). This approach requires a suitable expression system for
the particular system in use (such as baculovirus, E. coli, mammalian or plant cells) for manufacture.
This is estimated to take 2–3 weeks to produce [22], which is 3–4 weeks quicker than the generation
and testing of a reassorted CVV for egg vaccine manufacture in 2009 [23] (Figure 2). Even with the
advent of these new technologies since 2009, the testing and downstream process requirements align
most of these products with respect to vaccine availability. Currently, egg-based influenza vaccines still
constitute around 85%–90% of doses given annually, and so progress away from egg manufacturing of
influenza vaccines has been and is likely to continue to be slow. This may be enhanced by the recent
announcement of a US Presidential Executive order made on 19 September 2019 that “directs actions
to reduce the United States’ reliance on egg-based influenza vaccine production . . . . . . ” among other
measures to enhance the US preparedness for influenza pandemics (see [24]).
4. Challenges that Influenza Vaccine Manufacturers Encountered in 2009 and the Key Changes
That have Been Made Since
Key challenges are detailed below and summarised in Table 1.
4.1. Biocontainment
At the beginning of the 2009 pandemic, the initial requirement for biocontainment of the wildtype
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus was under Biosafety Level (BSL)-3 conditions as directed by the WHO [25].
This presented a significant issue in the preparation of CVVs as both wildtype and reassortant viruses
(made by classical reassorting processes or by RG), required the use of BSL-3 facilities. Furthermore,
it was deemed that attenuated CVVs (see below) were needed to ensure the safety of staff that may
be exposed during vaccine manufacture as the majority of the large vaccine manufacturing plants
could not operate as BSL-3 (only one influenza vaccine plant had BSL-3 capability in operation globally
in 2009). Thus, the CVVs required safety testing (including ferret pathogenicity testing) to ensure
attenuation prior to release for large-scale manufacture. In 2009, two reassorted attenuated CVVs
of the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus that had passed safety testing, IVR-153 (from CSL) and X-179A (from
NYMC), were available to manufacturers by the end of May.
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Figure 2. Processes for the manufacturing of influenza virus vaccines. The manufacturing process for
influenza vaccines with steps where improvements have been realised since 2009 are shown in white
(adapted from [23].) (A) In 2009, the majority of influenza vaccine was manufactured in embryonated
hen’s eggs. Candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs) were prepared by reassorting in 2009 and now there is
improved capability for more rapid reverse genetics. CVVs are characterised at a WHO Collaborating
Centre (CC) to ensure matched antigenicity and HA/NA sequences to the recommended strain. Strains
were tested to ensure attenuation by multiple methods in 2009, and now this has been streamlined
through risk assessment. Clinical trials may be performed to understand the immunogenicity of a
novel vaccine. A vaccine is formulated based on potency testing; new assays may enable potency to
be assigned earlier. Some vaccines are formulated with adjuvants, enabling dose sparing. Vaccines
are packaged and distributed. The timeline for each step in 2009 is indicated [23]. (B) Manufacture
of influenza vaccine in mammalian cells requires a CVV that is either prepared in eggs (as in A) or
cells [26]. All CVVs are characterised at a WHO CC and are also assessed to ensure attenuation, prior to
large-scale manufacturing. (C) The HA gene is inserted into the baculovirus genome and the resulting
recombinant baculovirus is amplified in insect cells to create a working virus bank (WVB). The WVB is
used for full-scale manufacture. Creation of a WVB is more rapid than generation and testing of CVVs.
(D) Clinical trials may be performed with manufactured product from the cell culture or recombinant
protein systems. Product is formulated and tested for potency prior to release (dotted line indicates
that potency testing occurs once assays are developed).
Safety testing of attenuation of influenza A strain remains a requirement for all newly developed
influenza A pandemic strains in 2020. Building on experiences with (1) A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, (2) the
attenuation of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses and (3) emergence of low pathogenic avian
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influenza viruses infecting humans (e.g., A(H7N9)), the WHO convened two informal consultations to
re-visit the guidelines (TRS 941, Annex 5, [27]) for the safe development and production of vaccines
for human pandemic influenza viruses and viruses with pandemic potential in 2017 and 2018 [28].
The WHO now recommends that the containment conditions for the generation or manufacture of
a pandemic, or potential pandemic CVV, is determined by both the category of CVV (reassortant,
wildtype, subtype) and an activity-based risk assessment. This risk assessment takes into account
the laboratory or manufacturing activity, the facility, PPE available and environmental risks [28].
While safety testing remains a requirement for all pandemic CVVs, a CVV may be shipped prior to
completion of some or all tests if deemed acceptable on the basis of additional risk assessments. Further,
a CVV can be considered for large-scale manufacture prior to completion of some or all tests if deemed
acceptable by the national regulatory authority [28]. Importantly, CVVs with an identical sequence
to those that have been previously generated and have passed safety testing can undergo a risk
assessment to determine whether re-testing is required. These changes in the guidelines allow for the
faster generation of a CVV and subsequent availability of a CVV to manufacturers, particularly when
the distribution of a CVV may be impeded, such as if borders are closed in future influenza pandemics.
4.2. Development of RG and Cell Culture CVVs
In 2009, RG strategies were undertaken by key laboratories throughout the world to develop
a CVV suitable for influenza virus vaccine manufacture. The advantage of RG is the ability to (1)
modify a gene sequence, such as removal of the polybasic site of a highly pathogenic H5 or H7 virus,
and (2) rescue a virus where the donor backbone is considered attenuated, such as the case with the
A/Puerto Rico/8/34 (A/PR/8/34), A/Ann Arbor/6/60 or A/Leningrad/134/17/57 ‘backbone’ viruses that
are currently utilised in egg reassorting approaches for both inactivated and live-attenuated influenza
vaccines. The introduction of a modified cleavage site has consistently reduced the pathogenicity for
avian embryos and poultry [29] and the use of internal genes from backbone donor viruses has a low
probability to harm human health, with many years of safe use in the manufacture of seasonal influenza
vaccines [30,31]. Notably, attenuation is not only required for safety, but to also enable manufacturing
of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses that are lethal to chicken embryos. Fortunately, the
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus did not have a polybasic cleavage site like some H5 and H7 viruses and so the
manipulation of the HA gene by RG was not required.
At the time of the 2009 pandemic, the generation of reassortants by RG was possible by cloning
the HA and NA genes from RNA extracted from the wildtype virus along with the other genes from
A/PR/8/34. Hence, the requirement for biocontainment due to handling of a wildtype virus and
the time taken for cloning, including site-directed mutagenesis and confirmation of the removal of
wildtype virus, delayed generation of a CVV by RG. Furthermore, initial RG rescue attempts of an
early A(H1N1)pdm09 strain, A/California/04/2009, were unsuccessful when the rescued virus was
passaged in embryonated eggs in preparation for vaccine manufacture. It was later found that rescue
could be rectified upon introduction of the egg adaptation mutations K209T and Q223R in the HA
gene that were observed later in the egg reassortant virus (14). Host passage adaptation highlights a
significant problem that may occur with novel viruses when using the RG rescue method and while
these problems may be overcome eventually, this may cause significant delays in CVV availability.
Since 2009, two approaches have been developed for the rapid generation of CVVs which require
the modification of the wildtype sequence for manufacture. Firstly, rescue of influenza virus by RG
has been improved by the use of synthetically generated plasmids. Sequence modifications, such as
the removal of the polybasic cleavage site in the HA protein, can be directly incorporated into the
nucleotide sequence obviating the need for site-directed mutagenesis and cloning from the wildtype
virus [32,33]. This approach significantly reduces the time from receipt of the synthesised DNA to the
rescue of RG virus in embryonated hen’s eggs to approximately 7 days, notably shorter than the 21 days
typically required to generate a conventional reassortant virus in eggs. A further technical advance
that has improved the availability of CVVs is the isolation and manufacture of influenza virus in
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mammalian cells which have a much higher virus isolation rate than eggs [21]. However, manufacture
in mammalian cells may still have similar biocontainment issues to egg-based systems with future
influenza pandemics, as this system also relies on the use of a live influenza virus. This issue is avoided
with the baculovirus system and other recombinant protein expression systems which only require the
HA sequence to be made available for vaccine production [15]. Passage and rescue of influenza viruses
in mammalian cells also negates the chance of egg adaptations as cell lines used to grow influenza virus
in vitro have similar receptors as the dominant human receptors in the upper respiratory epithelium
(α-2,6-linked sialosides) that binds the virus [34]. In contrast, embryonated eggs have a majority of
receptors that are α-2,3-linked sialosides, which can drive egg adaptations in the HA of the virus that
may result in improvement in the growth and yield of the virus [34]. However, some egg adaptations
can affect the neutralising epitopes that surround the sialoside binding site of the HA protein and
affect the antigenicity of the CVV and therefore the eventual vaccine, but passage in mammalian cells
minimises this risk [21,35]. Egg adaptions are also avoided with the baculovirus system in which the
HA protein sequence used is like the cell-propagated virus which is then expressed in insect cells [15].
4.3. Availability of Pre-Pandemic Stockpiles and Pre-Pandemic CVVs
Since the outbreak of sporadic human infections of highly pathogenic A(H5N1), many governments
have stockpiled influenza vaccines and vaccination equipment (e.g., syringes, PPE, vials) as part of
their preparedness for an influenza pandemic [36,37]. The goal of these stockpiles is to have a sufficient
stock of vaccine and other items to be able to respond quickly and provide vaccines to the populations
considered to be the highest priority and also to be a bridge to the availability of vaccine that will cover
the remaining population. However, the available influenza pandemic vaccine stockpiles were unable
to be used in 2009 as the A(H1N1) pandemic strain was unexpected and the existing stockpiles were
limited to avian-origin A(H5N1) influenza vaccines (although vaccination equipment was utilised [38]).
What was more readily available, at least in the Southern Hemisphere in 2009, was the 2009 seasonal
inactivated influenza vaccine containing the seasonal A(H1N1) virus, that was later found to have
modest efficacy against the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus (38% (95% CI: 19%, 53%)) [39].
In order to respond more quickly to a novel outbreak of influenza, laboratories that are involved in
the development of CVVs, including WHO CCs, WHO Essential Regulatory Laboratories (ERLs) and
reassorting laboratories, have isolated and developed, through conventional and RG techniques, a large
panel of potential pandemic CVVs in order to cover as many as possible of the potential human and
zoonotic influenza infections that have been observed to date [40]. To help countries select appropriate
vaccines for stockpiling from this large panel, various risk assessments have also been developed by
the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (known as IRAT [41]) and WHO
(known as TIPRA [42]).
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Table 1. Status changes in the manufacture of the influenza virus vaccine from 2009–2019.
Issue Situation in 2009 Situation in 2019
Vaccines All vaccines (live and inactivated) prepared in embryonated hen’seggs; only 7 manufacturers producing the majority of vaccines [11]
Expanded manufacturing platforms; embryonated hen’s eggs, mammalian cells,
baculovirus, recombinant proteins; number and geographical dispersion of
manufacturers increased [11]
Biocontainment
Strict biocontainment requirements for handling of wildtype virus
under BSL-3 conditions by WHO Biocontainment requirement determined locally by activity-based risk assessment [28]
CVV generated by reassorting limited to BSL-3 laboratories Biocontainment level required for CVV generation by reassortment determined byactivity-based risk assessment [28]
CVV generated by reverse genetics in BSL-3 laboratories, by
cloning from wildtype virus
CVV generated by reverse genetics in BSL-2 laboratories using synthetic genes with
any potentially pathogenic determinants (e.g., polybasic site) easily removed.
All CVVs must undergo safety testing (including ferret testing) to
demonstrate attenuation. All safety testing must be completed
prior to distribution
CVV must undergo safety testing to demonstrate attenuation. Risk assessment
performed to determine testing requirements prior to distribution
Results of safety test can be used for a further CVV with identical HA/NA sequence as
previously generated and tested CVV
Manufacture can only be performed at BSL-3 with wildtype virus
or BSL-2 with attenuated CVV once all safety testing is complete
Manufacture with wildtype or attenuated CVV assessed by activity-based
risk assessment
Host passage adaptations A/California/4/2009 CVV unable to be rescued in time for apotential CVV
Potential for rescue of CVV in mammalian cells as well as eggs; egg adaption sites
better understood
CVVs
Emerging pre-pandemic strains under constant surveillance by
WHO and panel of pre-pandemic CVVs prepared
Increased surveillance by WHO to identify emerging pre-pandemic strains, the panel
of pre-pandemic CVVs is constantly updated;IRAT [41] and TIPRA [42] risk
assessment tools now available to help with pandemic vaccine stockpile prioritisation
Genetic sequence of influenza viruses limited with few specialist
databases/tools and reliance on GenBank
Next generation sequencers and additional specialist influenza databases available
(GISAID, IRD) and online analysis tools (Nextstrain, IRD, GISAID, FluSurver)
Nagoya Protocol requires bilateral agreements if using virus from a signatory country
Adjuvants MF59 and AS03 licensed, approved and used in pandemic vaccines
MF59, Alum (Al(OH)3 and AlPO4), AS03 and virosomes licensed, approved and used
in seasonal vaccines. Adverse incidents to be considered before use in
future pandemic
Assessment of vaccine potency
and immunogenicity
SRID assay Alternate potency assays under development
Immunogenicity determined by clinical trial
Pre-pandemic clinical trials of novel subtypes would give insight as to appropriate
dose and vaccination regime; potential for use of government stockpiles with
cross-clade vaccines
‘Switching’ Manufacturing WHO declared a pandemic on June 11 2009, resulting in ‘switch’ inmanufacturing from seasonal to pandemic vaccines
Despite three “WHO Switch meetings” it is still unclear as to how a switch from
seasonal to pandemic vaccines would occur; potential for ‘switch’ to be initiated by
individual governments
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4.4. Adjuvants
An adjuvant is a biological or synthetic agent added to a vaccine to improve the immune response.
An adjuvant may be included in a vaccine targeted to a population known to have a poor immune
response (e.g., older adults, immunosuppressed patients). An adjuvant may also be included in
a widely used vaccine to boost the immunogenicity of an antigen, enable dose sparing of antigen
and induce a more rapid immune response [43,44]. These features are all favourable in an influenza
pandemic situation.
In 2009, oil-in-water adjuvants MF59 and AS03 were included as part of pandemic inactivated
influenza vaccines. Arepanrix (GlaxoSmithKline) and Pandemrix (GlaxoSmithKline) contained AS03
and were licensed and approved for use in Canada and Europe, respectively. Focetria (Novartis)
contained MF59 and was licensed and approved for use in Europe. All of these vaccines were
licensed for use in adults and children >6 months of age [45–48]. Importantly, these adjuvanted
vaccines enabled dose sparing in 2009. The immunogenicity of the adjuvanted pandemic vaccines,
as determined by seroconversion and seropositivity, was equivalent to that of the unadjuvanted
vaccine, despite containing half or a quarter of the amount of HA antigen per dose [47]. Notably,
the A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccine alone was also highly immunogenic in children and adults with one
dose deemed sufficient [49,50]. This is in contrast to results found in clinical studies assessing
the immunogenicity of novel avian influenza hemagglutinins, such as H5 and H7, where vaccines
containing much higher levels of antigen and adjuvants, and dosing with multiple immunisations,
were required for a sufficient antibody response ([51], reviewed in [52]). The addition of adjuvants to
vaccines may also increase the chance of adverse events, as was observed in 2009 when narcolepsy was
detected in some Swedish children following vaccination with monovalent A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccine
containing the AS03 adjuvant [53,54].
Currently, four adjuvants are licensed, approved and used in seasonal inactivated influenza
vaccines: MF59, Alum (Al(OH)3 and AlPO4), AS03 and virosomes (reviewed in [43,44]). It is expected
that these adjuvants would also be available for inclusion in future influenza pandemic vaccines.
Adjuvants can be stockpiled if they have a long shelf life (typically five years or longer), thus their
manufacture would not be expected to delay vaccine release. Human trials and animal studies indicate
that immunisation with A(H5N1) vaccines containing oil-in-water adjuvants increased the antibody
response and was broader in cross-reactivity than immunisation with a vaccine without adjuvant
([55], reviewed in [52]). As multiple doses of vaccine may be required to mount a protective immune
response against some avian influenza viruses, immunising with a stockpiled H5/H7 vaccine, with
(or without) adjuvant, may be useful to prime the immune response of individuals until a matched
vaccine is available ([56,57], reviewed in [52]).
4.5. Standardisation and Release of Vaccines
All influenza vaccines are tested for their potency to ensure that there is an appropriate amount
of antigen (HA protein) present in the vaccine. The current release assay for potency, the Single
Radial Immunodiffusion (SRID) assay, requires production of specific antiserum and reference antigen,
followed by assay calibration by WHO ERLs, a process that takes 2–3 months to perform [58,59].
The development of antiserum is dependent upon the production of purified HA that is enzymatically
cleaved from whole inactivated virus, to inject into sheep [60]. In 2009, the cleavage of HA under
standard conditions was problematic due to unexpected enhanced degradation. This was encountered
by multiple laboratories but NIBSC, UK produced sufficient cleaved HA to vaccinate sheep to produce
antiserum and this reagent was distributed to ERLs and manufacturers worldwide without significant
delay [23].
In 2010, the first workshop to discuss an alternate potency assay was convened in Ottawa, Canada.
Since this time, there have been three further workshops to develop alternate approaches including
ELISA, HPLC and mass spectroscopy, along with a series of publications (reviewed in [3,58]). Many of
these assays are considered rapid, accurate and precise, with a greater dynamic range than the current
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SRID release assay. ELISA- and HA-capture-based approaches can use monoclonal antibodies that are
specific and can, in principle, be applied to both a multivalent product as well as a pandemic vaccine.
Pre-development of subtype-specific monoclonal antibodies can ensure rapid application of a release
assay in the event of a pandemic. Alternatively, non-antibody-based assays (HPLC, mass spectroscopy)
that do not require the development of specific reagents are also being considered at these workshops.
These assays can determine the level of antigen but are not necessarily strain-specific nor do they
assess stability [3].
5. What Challenges Remain for the Next Influenza Pandemic Vaccine?
5.1. Future Pandemic Vaccine Immunogenicity Remains an Unknown
A critical aspect of influenza vaccine development is to administer sufficient viral antigen (generally
considered to be mainly HA but may also involve NA and other viral proteins) capable of inducing
a partially or fully protective immune response. For seasonal influenza, the majority of individuals
are primed by prior exposure via infection or vaccination and a single dose of 15µg seasonal HA
antigen (per strain) in a vaccine is considered sufficient to induce protective antibody levels in healthy
adults and/or reduce serious consequences of infection in the elderly [61]. In a pandemic situation,
the immune status of the population is likely to be different, such as in 2009 where the young were
naïve to the new strain and the elderly had been primed by prior exposure to a closely related A(H1N1)
strain from the early 1900s [62,63]. In a future pandemic, the level of antigen required to induce
protective immunity may differ by subtype of influenza virus. For example, to detect an antibody
response following immunisation with an A(H5N1) vaccine, 90 µg of HA was required, unless the
vaccine was adjuvanted, whereby 30–45 µg HA was sufficient [64]. For a novel influenza outbreak,
knowledge of the antigen dose for a vaccine and the number of vaccine doses to induce a sufficiently
protective response (i.e., the immunogenicity) is critical for prevention of infection and reduction in
morbidity and mortality, and also determines the vaccine coverage and timing that is possible.
In 2009, manufacturers were required to conduct clinical trials in adults and children to determine
antigen dose and the number of doses required for the pandemic influenza vaccine. Although this
information is required for mass vaccination, this decision delayed the availability of large quantities
of vaccine until November 2009 or later. While the next pandemic cannot be accurately predicted with
respect to time, origin or subtype, to be best prepared, a better understanding of the immunogenicity
and thus vaccine dose requirement (amount of antigen and number of doses) and the side effects
profiles for novel subtypes, may reduce the need for clinical trials and ameliorate the time to vaccinate
those most vulnerable, or even the overall population. Conducting pre-pandemic clinical trials in
adults and children may inform the vaccination regime required to induce a sufficient immune response
for a novel influenza subtype if it emerges. This would reduce the response time for the distribution of
vaccine to the general population, if a similar subtype causes a future pandemic.
5.2. Switching Vaccine Manufacturing from Seasonal Vaccines to Pandemic Vaccine
Influenza vaccines are manufactured in dedicated facilities where a single product is produced at
one time. While seasonal influenza vaccine production is virtually year-round at most sites, the outbreak
of a pandemic raises the problem that manufacturers must “switch” at some stage from producing
seasonal influenza vaccine to the pandemic vaccine, as both products cannot be manufactured in the
same facility at the same time. The timing of this decision remains a challenge. A clear signal/trigger for
vaccine manufacturers to switch vaccine production is critical to developing and distributing a pandemic
vaccine rapidly to meet contractual agreements with companies and governments. Most manufacturers
also have global commitments to provide seasonal influenza vaccines, and seasonal viruses may still be
circulating in some locations prior to the pandemic virus arriving. The WHO declaration of a pandemic
on June 11 2009 [65] provided the essential signal to “switch” for companies. This was eight weeks after
the pandemic virus was first detected (15 April 2009 [66]) and seven weeks after the WHO declared
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a “public health emergency of international concern” (PHEIC, made on April 25 2009 [67]). In the
future, if WHO is unwilling to make a unilateral declaration of an influenza pandemic, other earlier
declarations by WHO such as a “PHEIC“ may be sufficient to trigger a “switch”, yet generally this
decision will most likely be made by national governments in countries where manufacturers are
located. Many countries (57 countries) now have pandemic plans and over 95% (55/57 countries)
are triggered by the WHO declaration of a pandemic [68]. However, as only a minority of countries
have local facilities to produce their own vaccine (13/57), and the majority of countries (44/57) rely
on importing influenza vaccines [68], national decisions rather than an international declaration to
“switch” manufacturing would make the global pandemic vaccine co-ordination difficult or impossible
to achieve.
Since 2009, stakeholders have participated in three WHO “Switch” meetings to develop a global
strategy and operational mechanism for initiating the pandemic vaccine response, particularly when
seasonal influenza vaccine may still be needed in some parts of the world. This is a complex challenge
requiring interaction and co-operation between many stakeholders including the Global Influenza
Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), WHO CCs and ERLs, CVV reassorting laboratories, vaccine
manufacturers, governments, clinicians and vaccine programme managers. The outcomes from these
interactions are still being worked through with the aim to make this “switch” process smoother and
more transparent.
5.3. Pandemic Surveillance
As an influenza pandemic is considered inevitable but unpredictable, the number of surveillance
laboratories through the WHO has increased in the past ten years from 135 National Influenza Centres
(NIC) in 105 countries at the end of 2010 [69], to at least 146 NICs in 115 countries globally in 2019 [69,70].
This has improved the ability of WHO to rapidly identify and sequence potential pandemic viruses
at the earliest stage of a pandemic and allows the maximum time for CVV selection and vaccine
production. High-throughput sequencing, through use of next generation sequencing technologies,
more specialist influenza databases (e.g., GISAID, IRD) and online analysis tools (e.g., Nextstrain,
IRD, GISAID, FluSurver) are also now available, improving surveillance capacity and understanding.
There has also been a greater emphasis on the human–animal interface through the creation of the
One Health concept [71] and the promotion of better co-operation between human health and animal
health by WHO, World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO) and OFFLU (OIE–FAO global network).
5.4. The Nagoya Protocol and WHO Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework
The Nagoya Protocol on access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of
Benefits Arising from their Utilization (NP) is an international agreement which aims to share the
benefits resulting from the use of a country’s genetic resources, including influenza viruses, fairly and
equitably [72].
The NP treaty was enacted in October 2014 and human pathogens have been included in the
legislation on NP in many countries and regions, with over 120 countries being a Party to the
protocol [73]. From this point forward, the commercial use of influenza viruses (both seasonal and
pandemic) sourced from a signatory country or region requires a bilateral agreement between parties
(such as governments and individual manufacturers) within three months of receiving the virus.
The agreement is negotiated for commercial access of an influenza virus in exchange for sharing of
the benefits arising from its use, for example the provision of a set amount of pandemic influenza
vaccine. Timely access to influenza viruses is critical to ensure the “best” viruses are used, so CVVs to
develop vaccines are well-matched to the circulating (seasonal or pandemic) influenza viruses. In 2009,
the wildtype pandemic virus was shared with influenza reassorting laboratories within days of receipt
at WHO CCs to develop a CVV. However, given that the NP is now in place, there is concern that this
may hinder virus sharing and consequently result in a delayed, inconsistent and reduced CVV supply,
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which has potential to also increase costs if not addressed. The WHO, vaccine manufacturers and
governments are working to resolve this major issue.
As well as NP, another system has been introduced by WHO called the Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness (PIP) framework. This was introduced on 24 May 2011 in order to increase the access
in developing countries to vaccines, influenza antivirals and other pandemic-related supplies, and is
supported by agreements with influenza vaccine, antiviral and diagnostic product manufacturers [74].
PIP allows the movement of potential pandemic influenza viruses within the GISRS system and to
the various vaccine/antiviral/diagnostic product manufacturers. How these critical interactions will
be affected by NP, or if PIP-related materials will be excluded from the requirements under the NP
remains to be seen, and may not be clarified for a number of years to come.
6. Conclusions
The 2009 influenza pandemic, the first pandemic to occur in the post-molecular period,
was generally mild in severity. Our reflection on the lessons learned from the experience of 2009
highlights significant developments, whilst also identifying ongoing challenges still present some
11 years on.
The WHO continues to expand surveillance and its ability to detect novel viruses that may result
in a human pandemic. The early supply and sharing of viruses or genetic information is critical to an
effective pandemic response, not only for vaccine manufacture and availability, but also for antiviral
assessment and the development of diagnostics. The progress of synthetic RG and testing of backbone
genes to attenuate influenza A strains have enabled the development of CVVs without the need to
handle wildtype viruses and consequently reduced the biocontainment and safety testing required.
Alternate potency assays hold promise to enable the determination of potency and an earlier release
of vaccine than current traditional methods. Novel vaccine platforms improve the availability of
vaccines. However, challenges remain for timely manufacturing of vaccines and understanding of
the immunogenicity of vaccines containing novel HAs. Hence, other measures such as antivirals [75]
and non-pharmaceutical interventions [76] will continue to be important components of any future
influenza pandemic planning and response. Even with these challenges we are very fortunate to have
systems in place for the ready production of influenza vaccines to the next pandemic threat, unlike the
current pandemic threat with the novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2.
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